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BANKRUPTCY-FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAws-EFFECT OF Dis-
CHARGE OF AUTOMOBILE JUDGMENT UPON DRIVER'S LICENSE Sus-
PIENSIONS-Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
Adolfo Perez, driving a car registered in his name, was involved
in an automobile collision in Arizona. Mr. Perez was not carrying
automobile liability insurance at the time of the accident. The minor
who was driving the second car and her parents sued Mr. and Mrs.
Perez' in an Arizona state court for personal injuries and property
damage. Judgment was entered against them.
Mr. and Mrs. Perez filed petitions in bankruptcy and were dis-
charged from all their provable debts, including the judgment arising
from Mr. Perez's driving mishap.2 During the pendency of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, their driver's licenses and automobile registration
were suspended pursuant to the provisions of the Arizona Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Responsibility Act for failure to satisfy the judgment
within sixty days after its entry.3 The suspensions continued after the
Perezes received their discharges in bankruptcy, in accordance with
1. Although Mrs. Perez was in no way involved in the collision, the Perez automo-
bile was community property under Arizona law. Mrs. Perez was a proper nominal
defendant in the tort suit, but she was not a necessary party there. Both Mr. and Mrs.
Perez admitted liability. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 669 (1971).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). See Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467
(1925) (a judgment for tort is provable in bankruptcy).
3. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, ch. 7 (1956). Section 28-116(A) requires the
clerk of the court in which judgment is entered to forward a certified copy of the judg-
ment to the superintendent if the judgment is not satisfied within sixty days after
its entry. Section 28-1162(A) provides:
The superintendent upon receipt of a certified copy of a judgment, shall forthwith
suspend the license and registration and nonresident operating privilege of a
person against whom the judgment was rendered, except as otherwise provided in
this section and § 28-1165.
Under section 28-1163(A), the suspension is to continue until the judgment is satisfied
and the judgment debtor gives proof of financial responsibility. Section 28-1164 states
the requirements for satisfaction of a judgment. Sections 28-1167 to -1178 state the re-
quirements for forms of proof. But if the judgment creditor consents in writing and the
judgment debtors furnish proof of financial responsibility, the superintendent, in his
discretion, may restore the debtors' licenses and registration "for six months from the
date of the consent and thereafter until the consent is revoked in writing .. " ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1162(B) (1956). If the judgment debtors get a court order
allowing them to pay the judgment in installments and give proof of financial respon-
sibility, the debtors' licenses and registration would be restored until the creditor
notifies the superintendent of any default in payment. Id. § 28-1165.
Section 28-1163(B) provides:
A discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not
relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article.
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section 28-1163(B) of the Arizona Act which provides that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy shall not relieve judgment debtors of these pen-
alties.4
The Perezes then filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, arguing that section 28-1163(B) was in conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act 5 and thus violated the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. 6 The district court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.7 On writ of cer-
tiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed. Held: the chal-
lenged provision conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act and is unconstitu-
tional under the supremacy clause. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971).
In almost all cases where state statutes have been challenged on the
ground that they were unconstitutional under the supremacy clause,
the test that the Supreme Court has applied is "whether, under the cir-
cumstances of this particular case, [the state's] law stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 8 The relative merit of the particular state law
has generally been disregarded when that law conflicts with a valid
federal enactment. 9
Prior to Perez, the Court had made an exception to the usual test
applied in supremacy clause cases when deciding the validity of finan-
cial responsibility laws. 10 Instead of testing these laws by their effect
4. ARM. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (1956). See note 3, supra.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). It provides that "Ia] discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," with certain exceptions which are not applic-
able here.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land .. " Petitioners also challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Ari-
zona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act on the grounds that they imposed invol-
untary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment, denied fourteenth amend-
ment due process and equal protection, and operated as a bill of attainder in violation
of art. 1. § 10 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not consider these claims.
7. Perez v. Campbell, 421 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1970).
8. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Accord. Nash v. Florida Indus.
Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225.
229 (1964).
9. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
10. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962): Reitz v. Mealey.
314 U.S. 33 (1941). In addition, some lower federal courts and state courts have consi-
dered the constitutionality of similar provisions in financial responsibility acts. Many of
these courts have upheld the provisions. E.g., In re Locker, 30 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y.
344
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on the Bankruptcy Act, the Court evaluated their purpose. The Court
consistently found that since the purpose of the financial responsibility
acts was highway safety1' and not just the protection of creditors, they
did riot conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. In Reitz v. Mealey,12 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute 3 which
provided for suspension of the driver's license and vehicle registration
of any person if a judgment against him was not paid within fifteen
days. The suspension continued for three years or until the judgment
was satisfied or discharged, except by a discharge in bankruptcy.
Twenty-one years later, in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,' 4
the validity of the Utah Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act' 5 was
challenged. Again, the Court sustained the state law. The majority
reasoned that the Utah Act was "not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted
Creditors," and that "the bearing of the statute on the purposes served
by bankrupcty legislation [was] essentially tangential.' 6
There were dissenting opinions in both Reitzi7 and Kesler.' 8 Sev-
eral members of the Reitz and Kesler Courts believed that the finan-
cial responsibility provisions were unconstitutional because of their
conflict with the Bankruptcy Act.19 They saw the state schemes to be
"a powerful weapon for the collection of a debt from which [the]
bankrupt has been released by federal law" and thus a denial of "the
federal immunity given by section 17 of the Bankrupcty Act-an ef-
1939); Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153,
46 N.W.2d 52 (1951) (dictum); De Vries v. Alger, 329 Mich. 68, 44 N.W.2d 872 (1950);
Smith v. Hayes, 133 N.E.2d 443 (Ohio C.P. 1955). Contra, Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d
115 (3d Cir. 1970) (held that as applied to debtors who have judgments against them
based on remote vicarious tort liability, such a provision conflicts with section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act); Ellis v. Rudy, 171 Md. 280, 189 A. 281, 283 (1937) (construed the
state financial responsibility law, concerning revocation of license and registration for
failure to satisfy judgments, as not applying to judgment debtors who had been dis-
charged in bankruptcy, because otherwise an "irreconcilable conflict would arise be-
tween the federal and the state enactments"); In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D.N.Y.
1933).
11. Four justices on the Perez Court found the Arizona provision constitutional, as
to Mr. Perez, on the ground of public policy. See note 22, infra.
12. 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
13. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw § 94-b (Cahill, 1930).
14. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
15. UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 41, ch. 12 (1953).
16. Kesler, 369 U.S. at 174.
17. 314 U.S. at 40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. 369 U.S. at 182 (Black, J., dissenting).
19. One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to give the debtor "a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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fect which makes the law of [the state] rather than the law of Con-
gress 'the Supreme Law of the Land.' "20
The Court in Perez noted that the controlling principle in su-
premacy clause cases is "that any state legislation which frustrates the
full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy
Clause."21 Since the Arizona provision in issue compels the judgment
debtor to forego the benefit of his discharge in bankruptcy if he wants
to continue to operate a motor vehicle, it frustrates the full effective-
ness of the Bankruptcy Act and is therefore invalid. 22
The Court overruled Reitz and Kesler, finding the doctrine formu-
lated by those cases "aberrational." That doctrine enabled states to
frustrate "the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature
in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustra-
tion."123 The Perez Court believed that to rule otherwise would permit
states to nullify unwanted federal statutes simply by declaring the
purpose of the state legislation to be one other than frustration.2 4
20. Kesler, 369 U.S. at 183.
21. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652.
22. Id. In a separate opinion written by Justice Blackmun, four members of the Court
concurred in the result as to Mrs. Perez, but dissented as to Mr. Perez. The minority
stated that they would adhere to the rulings in Reitz and Kesler and
hold that the States have an appropriate and legitimate concern with highway
safety; that the means Arizona has adopted with respect to one in [Mr. Perez's pos-
ition, that is, the negligent driver] ... in its attempt to assure driving competence
and care on the part of its licensees, as well as to protect others, is appropriate state
legislation; and that the Arizona statute, like its Utah counterpart, despite the tan-
gential effect upon bankruptcy, does not operate in derogation of the Bankruptcy
Act or conflict with it to the extent that it may rightly be said to violate the Su-
premacy Clause.
Id. at 664. But as to Mrs. Perez, who was not in the car at the time of the accident, the
minority said that the State's action in suspending her driver's license "interferes with
the paramount federal interest in her bankruptcy discharge and violates the Supremacy
Clause." Id. at 67 1.
23. Id. at 651-52.
24. Id. at 652. The Court went on to state that even if the analysis of Kesler and
Reitz were applied in this case, the Arizona provision would not be upheld. For the Ari-
zona Supreme Court has ruled that the principal purpose of the Arizona Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act is to protect judgment creditors. Schecter v. Killingsworth. 93
Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963). Whereas the statutes in Reitz and Kesler "had
the effect of frustrating federal law but had, the [Kesler] Court said, no such purpose
[to protect judgment creditors], the Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose."
Perez, 402 U.S. at 654.
The majority dismissed the minority's contention that by passing a statute for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 40-464 (1967), which is similar to Arizona's section
28-1163(B), Congress must have regarded the Bankruptcy Act and the anti-discharge
provision as consistent and compatible. Legislative history indicates that in passing the
District of Columbia Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, "Congress gave no
attention to the interaction of the anti-discharge section with the Bankruptcy Act.-
Perez, 402 U.S. at 655.
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By comparing the supremacy clause test developed in Hines v. Dav-
idowitz and other cases, 25 the doctrine of Reitz and Kesler does appear
"aberrational." The decision in Perez is consistent with the approach
taken by the Court in other instances of federal-state conflict.26
The Perez majority said that "analysis discloses no reason why the
States should have broader power to nullify federal law" in the fields
of bankruptcy or highway safety than in other fields.27 Forty-four
other states, including Washington, have statutes similar to Arizona's.28
25. See note 8 and accompanying text, supra.
26. The Perez decision is somewhat analogous to Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234 (1934). In Local Loan the Court held that an assignment of future-earned wages to
secure a loan is not a lien which survives a discharge in bankruptcy. The decision re-jected the Illinois rule that an assignment of future wages constitutes an enforceable
lien, because the Illinois rule wa "destructive of the purpose and spirit of the bank-
ruptcy act." Id. at 245.
There does not seem to be any other case in which the Supreme Court has upheld state
laws which arguably conflict with the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. Fines
for violating the law are not dischargeable in bankruptcy because they are not provable
under the Bankruptcy Act. IA W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY f 17.05, at 1587 (14th ed. 1971).
Neither are "liabilities for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another" dischargeable in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(8), 11 U.S.C. § 35a(8)
(1970). A debtor's promise to pay a provable debt, made after the filing of his petition in
bankruptcy, is enforceable. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913). This situation also
can be distinguished from Perez in that where the debtor promises to pay the debt, he is
voluntarily relinquishing the "federal immunity" given by the Bankruptcy Act, whereas
in the financial responsibility act situation, the state denies the debtor the "federal im-
munity" given by the Bankruptcy Act.
But some state courts have upheld state laws which arguably frustrate the effect of a
discharge in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Hope v. License Bd., 228 Cal. App. 2d 414, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1964). The Hope court upheld a state statute which provided that adjudica-
tion and acts of bankruptcy constitute cause for disciplinary action (including license
revocation) against contractors, relying on the "purpose analysis" of Kesler. See Kesler,
369 U.S. at 153; Tracy v. License Bd., 63 Cal. 2d 598, 407 P.2d 865, 47 Cal. Rptr. 561(1965). Tracy upheld the Registrar of Contractors' decision to suspend the bankrupt con-
tractor's license until he gets a release of certain claims, even though those claims were
discharged in bankruptcy. See also Carter v. Sutton, 147 Ga. 496, 94 S.E. 760
(1917) (held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not destroy a landlord's right to evict the
debtor for nonpayment of rent); State v. Bontz, 192 Kan. 158, 386 P.2d 201 (1963) (held
that a discharge in bankruptcy does not abate a worthless check prosecution under a
statute allowing abatement if, among other things, the defendant pays the amount of the
check into court; stating that this case is analogous to Kesler); Evans v. Staalle, 88
Minn. 253, 92 N.W. 951 (1903) (held that land equitably charged with the payment of a
judgment debt is not released by the debt's discharge in bankruptcy); Leach v. Arm-
strong, 236 Mo. App. 382, 156 S.W.2d 959 (1941) (held that a discharged debt is charge-
able to diminish an heir's share in the equitable accounting of an estate); McClendon v.
Kenin, 235 Ore. 588, 385 P.2d 615 (1963) (held that a labor union bylaw which sus-
pends membership for failure to pay or make satisfactory arrangements to pay a debt
owed to another member, does not subvert the Bankruptcy Act; relying on Reitz and
Kesler).
27. 402 U.S. at 652.
28. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 74(55) (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.350
(1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1457 (1957); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16372 (West 1971);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-5(2) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-131 (1970);
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Applying the principle of Perez to these states' legislation, the
anti-discharge provisions will be struck down.2 9 The remainder of this
note will discuss the purposes of financial responsibility laws and will
propose alternative measures which will fill the void Perez creates.
Both accident prevention and compensation of traffic victims have
been cited as justifications for financial responsibility acts.30 It may be
argued that financial responsibility laws are safety measures for two
reasons: first, they encourage persons to drive more carefully because of
the fear of losing their driver's licenses for failure to satisfy judgments
against them and, second, they take some dangerous drivers off the
highways. Yet today, nearly all claims that financial responsibility acts
are safety measures have been abandoned. 3' The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals recently referred to such a claim as a "fiction;" ''any driver
DELi. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2943 (1953): HAWAII REV. STAT. § 287-17 (1968); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49-1514 (1967); ILl. ANN. SrXT. ch. 951/2, § 7-310 (Smith-Hurd 1971):
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321A.14(2) (1966); KAN. STAr. ANN. § 8-744(b) (1964); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 187.420 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:893 (1963); ME. REx.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 783(6) (1965) (10 years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2. § 7-315
(1970): MiCH. SrAT. ANN. § 9.2213(b) (1968), Mich. CosiP. LAWS ANN. § 257.513(b);
MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 170.33 subd. 5 (Supp. 1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 8285-14(b)
(1956); Mo. ANN. StAT. § 303.110 (1963); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 53-431 (1961):
NEB. REV. STAr. § 60-519 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 485.303(2) (1969); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 268:9 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-35 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 64-24-78 (1960); N.Y. VEi. & TRAF. LAW § 337(c) (McKinney Supp. 1970):
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.14 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-04(5) (Supp.
1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.43 (Page Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 7-3 15 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1414 (1971); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
31-32-15 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-741 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 32-35-58
(1967): TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1236 (1968); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h,
§ 14(b) (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-15 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23. §
802(b) (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-444(a)(4) (Supp. 1971) (15 years); WASH.
REV. CODE § 46.29.380 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-4-6(b) (1966); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 344.26(2) (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-299 (1967). See also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 324.131 (1968) and FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIEN. REP. 311 (1961); GA. CODE
ANN. § 92A-605(e)(3) (Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1049 (1965), and 1936
Op. IND. ATT'Y GEN. 272; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 22A (Supp. 1970); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 486.251(2) (1969).
29. The Washington Department of Motor Vehicles
considers that under the Perez decision a final discharge in bankruptcy will operate
a complete bar to the imposition of the terms of the Financial Responsibility Law
as they apply to driving privilege or drivers license suspensions for failure to satisfy
a judgment within thirty days from the date that it is entered.
Letter from Edward H. Clancy, Manager of Division of Financial Responsibility, State
of Washington Department of Motor Vehicles, October 5, 197 1, on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review.
30. R. KEE[ON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
102-03 (1965).
31. Id. at 107. Contra, I NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS
AND ORDINANCES. TRAFFIC LAWs ANNUAi 1964, 245 (1964).
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knows that" financial responsibility laws bear no "meaningful rela-
tionship to his driving habits or the protection of life and limb. '32 The
Third Circuit is correct in stating that financial responsibility acts do
not affect one's driving habits; but it seems that financial responsi-
bility acts do protect "life and limb" to the extent that some dangerous
drivers are taken off the highways, that is, to the extent that dan-
gerous drivers who do not satisfy judgments against them lose their
driver's licenses and do not continue to drive. Perez will adversely af-
fect highway safety to the extent that it will help put some dangerous
drivers back on the highways sooner than if they were required to pay
the discharged judgments before regaining their driver's licenses.
There is at least one alternative measure open to the states to com-
pensate for any adverse effects which Perez will have on highway
safety "without running roughshod over immunities that the United
States... has chosen to give its citizens. '33 That alternative is the sus-
pension of the driver's licenses of those who negligently cause automo-
bile accidents, regardless of financial responsibility. This alternative
would be more effective as a safety measure than the present
anti-discharge provisions in two ways. First, under present financial
responsibility laws, whatever amount of highway safety is achieved is
at the expense of impecunious drivers. Drivers who negligently cause
automobile collisions and pay judgments against them are not neces-
sarily taken off the highways. If one believes the safety "fiction" that
financial responsibility laws encourage persons to drive more carefully
because of the fear of losing their driver's licenses for failure to satisfy
judgments against them, this alternative would be more effective than
present law because it would deter all drivers, rather than just drivers
who are unable to pay judgments against them, from negligent or
reckless driving. Second, such a measure would keep more dangerous
drivers off the highways after they have once caused accidents, since
drivers of every level of financial resources would be affected by it.
The other purpose of financial responsibility laws, providing finan-
cial protection to accident victims, is a serious problem for the nation.
Traffic accidents, injuries, and deaths have reached staggering propor-
tions. In 1969 there were 15,500,000 motor vehicle accidents;3 4 4,-
32. Millerv. Anckaitis, 436F.2d 115, 118(3dCir. 1970).
33. Kesler, 369 U.S. at 184 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1970).
349
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700,000 persons were injured in those accidents;35 2,000,000 persons
received disabling injuries;36 and 56,400 persons died as a result of
those accidents. 37 The total cost of the accidents was $12.2 billion. 38
Yet sixty-one percent of the total compensable loss to seriously injured
persons and dependents of deceased persons is not compensated. 39
Perez will have some adverse effect on the financial protection prov-
ided to automobile accident victims under financial responsibility
laws.40 Without the pressure which the loss of his license puts on the
judgment debtor to pay his discharged debt, it is to be expected that
fewer discharged debtors will pay those discharged debts.41
35. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 552 (1970).
36. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 3 (1970).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5.
39. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND
THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1971) (percentage uncompensated in
1967).
40. But it does not seem likely that Perez will encourage people who would other-
wise carry automobile liability insurance to forgo insurance, because under the usual
financial responsibility laws, the driver of an automobile involved in an accident may
have his license suspended (for a limited period of time) prior to the rendering of any
judgments against him, unless he deposits security to satisfy any judgments which may
be recovered against him, or has liability insurance, or comes within one of the other
limited exceptions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1142 (Supp. 1970), WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.29.060 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
41. In fiscal year 1971, the Washington Department of Motor Vehicles suspended
the licenses of 1,040 persons for non-payment of judgments under WASH. REV. CODE §
46.29.330 (1970). Letter from Edward H. Clancy, Manager, Division of Financial Re-
sponsibility, Department of Motor Vehicles, State of Washington, October 19, 197 1, on
file with the Washington Law Review. Since statistics as to the number of judgment
debtors who satisfy the judgments against them and regain their driver's licenses seem
to be unavailable, it is impossible to determine how much of an effect Perez will have.
The effectiveness of the present financial responsibility acts in financially protecting
traffic victims may be seriously questioned. It is estimated that between ten and fifteen
percent of the drivers in financial responsibility states do not carry liability insurance.
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: THE KEETON-
O'CONNELL PLAN AND ITS CRITICS 117 (1967). The results of a 1967 survey by the
Washington Department of Motor Vehicles show that about twelve percent of
Washington registered passenger cars are uninsured. WASHINGTON DEP'T OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, STUDY TO DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE OF INSURED PASSENGER VEHICLES
(1968). Even if the accident victim is fortunate enough to be injured by an insured
driver and is able to secure a judgment against him, financial responsibility laws
"protect" the victim only for a limited amount of damages. The judgment debtor is
deemed to have satisfied the judgment against him when he has paid the victim a
minimum amount on the judgment. Among the various states, the minimum amount
required to satisfy a judgment for bodily injury to or death of one person, ranges
from $5,000 to $20,000. The majority of states have adopted the $10,000 figure.
WASH. REV. CODE § 46 .2 9.390(l)() (1970) provides, inter alia, for a minimum of
$15,000 in the event "of bodily injury to or death of one person as the result of any
one accident .. " Although the minimum amount required to satisfy the judgment
may be sufficient actually to pay the judgment in the majority of cases, five, ten, or
350
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There are constitutionally valid measures which the state legisla-
tures and Congress can take toward financial protection of traffic vic-
tims which will fill whatever gap Perez leaves in financial protection
and, in fact, will better protect traffic victims than the present finan-
cial responsibility laws. Two of the measures available to the states are
the establishment of compulsory automobile liability insurance 42 and
no-fault insurance.43 Compulsory insurance acts give more protection
to accident victims than financial responsibility laws, since fewer
drivers are uninsured in compulsory insurance states.44 A form of
no-fault insurance should be adopted if it is decided that all highway
victims-negligent "victims" as well as the innocent who are able to
obtain judgments--should be given financial protection. 45 Compul-
sory liability insurance or no-fault insurance which has only a limited
amount of coverage would afford better financial protection to injured
even twenty thousand dollars will not compensate the accident victim who received
a permanent serious injury. To this victim, the present financial responsibility laws
are of little consequence.
The innocent victim is often not protected even to the extent of the statutory min-
imum. One such situation is where the victim is injured by a hit-and-run driver. Another
situation is where the negligent driver carries no liability insurance and has insufficient
funds to pay any judgment which may be entered against him. Various states have used
devices to try to close the gap in insurance coverage. A few states have created unsatis-
fied judgment funds from which victims are paid when their judgments go unsatisfied. R.
KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra at 116. Another device is the requirement that insurance
companies offer uninsured motorist coverage to motorists who buy negligence liability,
insurance. Id. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030 (Supp. 1971).
42. A few states now have compulsory automobile liability insurance laws. R.
KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 41, at 251. An argument may be made that compul-
sory liability insurance violates the equal protection clause, since indigent drivers may
be financially unable to purchase the insurance. But recently the Supreme Court stated
that the fourteenth amendment would not be violated by a statute which bars the issu-
ance of licenses to all drivers who do not have liability insurance or do not post security.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (dictum). The traditional equal protection test
is "whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of a valid state objective." Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970).
Compulsory liability insurance acts should be upheld because the distinction between
the affluent and the indigent driver rests on grounds relevant to the achievement of a
valid state objective-the financial protection of accident victims.
43. In 1970 Massachusetts enacted a no-fault insurance act. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1970). In 1971 the Illinois legislature passed a no-fault insurance
act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.150 (Smith Hurd 1971). See Ring, Illinois No-Fault
Plan-Legalized Consumer Fraud, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 34 (criticizes the Illinois
legislation).
44. It is estimated that over 99% of the drivers in Massachusetts are insured.
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: THE KEETON-
O'CONNELL PLAN AND ITS CRITICS 117 (1967).
45. R. KEETON, COMPENSATION SYSTEMS: THE SEARCH FOR A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO NEGLIGENCE LAW 11-23 (1969). Keeton summarizes the various proposals for reform
concerning compensation of persons injured in automobile accidents.
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persons than the present financial responsibility laws, since more persons
would be insured, and with no-fault insurance proof of negligence
would not be required in order to recover. Thus, either of these mea-
sures would fill whatever void Perez creates in providing financial
protection to traffic victims. Yet to protect effectively the seriously
injured victim, the amount of insurance coverage must be virtually
unlimited. This would be a great improvement over present financial
responsibility laws.
One measure that Congress can take which will put the states in
approximately the same position they were in before Perez is to
amend the Bankruptcy Act to provide that motor vehicle tort liability
is not discharged in bankruptcy.46 An alternative measure which Con-
gress can take is to establish national no-fault insurance, which would
greatly increase the amount of financial protection to traffic victims. 47
After Perez, the states can no longer deny a motorist his driver's li-
cense until he pays a motor vehicle tort judgment which has been dis-
charged in bankruptcy. The decision will have some effect on the
purposes of financial responsibility laws-safety and financial protec-
tion of traffic victims. Regardless of how great the effect will be, the
decision does not leave the states helpless to provide for the safety and
financial protection of their citizens. Several constitutionally valid
measures are available to the state legislatures and the Congress to
fulfill the purposes of financial responsibility acts. These measures
should be pursued, not only to fill the void created by Perez, but also
because they will be more effective than present financial responsi-
bility laws in promoting safety and in providing financial protection to
traffic victims.
46. As early as 1932, then Professor William 0. Douglas suggested the possibility of
amending the Bankruptcy Act so that owners and operators of automobiles are not dis-
charged from such "judgments as would be covered by, say, a standard $5,000-S10.000
liability policy." Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy', 41 YAI E L.J. 329,
343 (1932).
47. Bills relating to no-fault insurance have been introduced in Congress and hear-
ings have been held on the subject. See, e.g., Hearings on H. Con. Res. 241, H.R. 4994,
H.R. 3968, atnd H.R. 3970 Before the Subcomnmn. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
For a discussion and criticism of one of the bills which have been introduced see Span-
genberg, The Federal No-Fault Plan-Benefits for Sale, TRIA. Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 30.
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